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VALUING ASSETS HELD BY PRIVATE 
EQUITY FUNDS
By D avid  L. L a rse n , CPA
In December 2003, the Private Equity 
Industry Guidelines Group (PEIGG) 
released their U.S. Private Equity Val­
uation  G uidelines (G uidelines). 
Amended in September 2004, the 
Guidelines include guidance related 
to the valuing of assets held by private 
equity funds. As the private equity 
industry has matured over the past 
two decades, valuation standards have 
become an area of increasing focus 
for all industry participants. The 
National Venture Capital Association 
(NVCA) attempted to focus on valua­
tion issues in the late 1980s but could 
not reach a consensus on standards. 
However, NVCA’s 1989-1990 pro­
posed guidelines became the de facto 
standards, which are used by a large 
number of U.S. private equity fund 
m anagers in valuing their invest­
ments.
Outside the United States, private 
equity industry groups in several 
coun tries adop ted  standard ized  
guidelines for valuing portfolio com­
panies. In early 2005, through a joint 
effort of the Association Française des 
Investisseurs en Capital (AFIC), the 
British Venture Capital Association 
(BVCA), and the European Venture 
Capital Association (EVCA), the 
International Private Equity and Ven­
ture Capital Valuation Guidelines 
were released. The guidelines were 
subsequently endorsed by the Institu­
tional Limited Partners Association 
(ILPA) and more than 30 other inter­
national associations.
Before the in troduction of the 
PEIGG G uidelines, many private
equity participants believed that the 
development of formal standards or 
gu idelines was im portan t. The 
PEIGG Valuation Guidelines were 
created jointly by managers (that is, 
general partners) and investors (that 
is, limited partners), incorporating 
feedback from a wide range of indus­
try participants to address this need 
in the industry. United States GAAP 
for investment companies, including 
private equity and venture capital 
funds, is provided in the AICPA 
Investm ent Com pany A udit and 
Accounting Guide. PEIGG has no 
authoritative standing in the GAAP 
hierarchy and PEIGG guidelines do 
not represent authoritative GAAP. 
However, the PEIGG valuation guide­
lines were prepared to provide pri­
vate equity managers with industry 
specific best practices in determining 
fair value.
The Financial Accounting Stan­
dards Board (FASB) is expected to 
issue a Standard on “Fair Value Mea­
surements” in 2006. The new FASB 
Standard will focus attention again 
on the need for consistent, compara­
ble estimates of fair value in the PE 
asset class. PEIGG anticipates revisit­
ing the V aluation G uidelines to 
ensure that they are not in conflict 
with GAAP once the new FASB Stan­
dard is effective.
HISTORICAL VALUATION APPROACH
It is difficult to generalize about his­
torical valuation approaches without 
excluding the nuances used in prac­
tice. In the U.S. private equity indus-
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try, private equity investments often 
are valued using the de facto NVCA 
Valuation Guidelines (never for­
mally endorsed by NVCA), which uti­
lize cost or the last round of financ­
ing as the basis for underly ing  
portfolio companies. Given the diffi­
culty and judgment inherent in valu­
ing illiquid nonpublic companies, 
this approach was often used as a 
m ethod for determ ining the fair 
value of investments. The value of 
the investment, however, was gener­
ally written down any time the man­
ager considered the value impaired. 
Basing estimates of fair value on cost 
or the most recent round of financ­
ing was regarded as conservative, 
easy to understand, and not overtly 
subject to manipulation. If the value 
of the investment begins to increase 
or decrease, however, valuation 
based on the most recent round of 
financing would no longer be appro­
priate. The valuation of securities 
issued by private companies differs 
from identifying the prices of securi­
ties issued by public com panies. 
Despite the wide spectrum of invest­
ments, from minority investments in 
private companies with no obvious 
comparables to investments in highly 
liquid public securities, it is clear that 
investment professionals have the 
ability to determ ine the value of 
most investments, at least at the time 
they make the investment. There­
after, until a new round of financing 
occurs, or an exit is effected, judg­
m ent is necessary to determ ine  
whether the value has changed posi­
tively or negatively. Some partici­
pants are concerned about the relia­
bility of measures that are derived 
from techniques that are not based 
on recent prices.
THE NEED FOR GUIDELINES
The U.S. private equity industry his­
torically had not seen a great need 
for valuation standards until the 
technology bubble burst in 2000. At 
that time, limited partners became 
concerned that valuations based on 
recent rounds may not have rapidly 
incorporated changes in value. Stan­
dards have also become necessary as 
a result of the huge influx of capital 
into private equity and because cer­
tain limited partners are subject to 
Freedom of Information Act disclo­
sures, resulting in greater public visi­
bility into rates of return of funds in 
which they invest.
In addition, many investors who 
p repare  financial statem ents in 
accordance with U.S. generally  
accepted  accounting  p rincip les 
(GAAP) are required to record their 
investments at fair value. Fair value is 
defined as “the amount at which an 
investment could be exchanged in a 
current transaction between willing 
parties, other than in a forced or liq­
uidation sale.”1 As a result, limited 
partner investors are encouraging 
fund managers to provide timely, 
consistent, and robust estimates of 
fair value.
An investment manager is gener­
ally in a far better position to deter­
mine fair value than are individual 
investors. Accounting standard set­
ters have not provided authoritative
guidelines that would require spe­
cific procedures for estimating fair 
value of private equity investments. 
As a result, private equity managers 
needed  a fram ework for valuing 
investments in portfolio companies 
at fair value on a consistent and pru­
d en t basis in o rd er to provide 
greater consistency and transparency 
within the private equity industry.
VALUATION OPTIONS
AS PEIGG was evaluating how to 
provide the private equity industry 
with guidelines that would provide 
greater consistency and transparency 
for investors, two primary options 
were considered:
1. Lower of Cost or Impaired Value
(which would not be in accor­
dance with GAAP), or
2. Fair Value
The Lower of Cost or Impaired 
Value approach  is sim ple and 
straightforward and limits volatility. 
However, it does not comply with 
GAAP for investment companies.
The Fair Value approach has the 
po ten tia l to increase rep o rted  
interim volatility because it requires 
that investments be carried at fair 
value at each reporting date, but 
complies with GAAP and provides 
users of information with greater 
transparency into the performance 
of the investment.
PEIGG APPROACH
In selecting between the two primary 
options for valuing private equity 
investments, PEIGG determined that 
the industry is best served by focus­
1 AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide, Investment Companies, chapter 1, paragraph 3.
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ing on fair value rather than a non- 
GAAP approach . A fair value 
approach would result in the same 
valuation being used by a manager 
in its GAAP financial statements, its 
investor conferences, and its fund­
raising docum ents. An approach 
that focused exclusively on cost or 
the most recent round of financing 
could result in different values being 
presented by a manager in its finan­
cial statements and its m arketing 
and solicitation documents.
Many funds that currently use the 
most recent financing round as the 
primary method to value their invest­
ments state explicitly in their finan­
cial statements that they believe this 
method provides their best approxi­
mation of fair value. As a result, the 
use of a more comprehensive range 
of valuation techniques to estimate 
fair value, as outlined in the PEIGG 
Guidelines, is not not expected to 
have an immediate impact on pri­
vate equity valuations. Over time, it is 
expected that valuations will change 
from period to period, up or down, 
more quickly than they do today. 
More frequent changes in valuation 
could resu lt in g rea ter in terim  
volatility, but will likely result in 
fewer large changes in value upon 
exit because the exit value of an 
investm ent will be closer to the 
adjusted fair value than it was to the 
most recent round.
The perceived increase in volatil­
ity under a more robust fair value 
approach  is unsettling  to some 
investors and managers. A parallel 
can be drawn with other asset classes 
that made the shift to mark-to-mar­
ket (“fair value”) valuations. Volatil­
ity did occur. This, however, has 
been a positive developm ent and 
helped in the maturation of other 
asset classes. Private equity is cur­
rently at a similar crossroads and 
should  now be p rep ared  to go 
through similar growing pains.
DETERMINING FAIR VALUE ON A 
CONSISTENT BASIS
The use of fair value requires man­
agers to exercise judgm ent. The 
PEIGG Valuation Guidelines provide 
a framework whereby different man­
agers can approach the valuation 
process using a common methodol­
ogy. Although managers’ judgment 
will result in different but support­
able views on valuation, using a com­
mon methodology should narrow 
the range of these results.
In p rinc ip le , the G uidelines 
encourage the following:
1. All investments should be carried 
at their fair value.
2. Quoted prices in active markets 
are the best evidence of fair value 
and should be used as the basis 
for measurement, if available.
3. For investments in private compa­
nies, it is appropriate to use cost 
or the latest round of financing as 
a proxy for fair value for a period 
of time.
4. After a period of time, cost or the 
latest round of financing becomes 
less precise as an approximation 
of fair value. Therefore, the man­
ager should assess changes in cir­
cum stances th a t may lead to 
adjustments to the carrying value 
of the investm ent. Once this 
assessm ent is m ade, and it is 
determined that a change to the 
carrying value of the investment is 
necessary, the following method­
ologies are recommended:
a. Comparable company transac­
tions
b. Performance multiples 
C. Other valuation methodologies 
These estimation techniques are
explained more fully in the Valua­
tion Guidelines.
VALUATION POLICY COMMITTEE
To provide input into the valuation 
process, the Guidelines suggest that 
managers establish a valuation policy 
committee. The purpose of the com­
mittee is to understand the valuation 
policies and procedures of the man­
ager and to understand and com­
ment on deviations from that policy. 
It is not expected that the valuation 
policy committee will approve valua­
tions, but will serve as a sounding 
board, working with the manager to 
monitor adherence to a fund’s pol­
icy param eters. A fund ’s existing 
advisory committee may fulfill this 
function where appropriate.
IMPACT OF HISTORIC PRACTICE
The first and greatest impact that the 
Guidelines are having on the indus­
try is to provide a fram ew ork 
whereby all private equity invest­
ments can be valued using a consis­
tent approach.
Initially, it is not expected that 
there will be major changes in how a 
fund values its investments. Over 
time, however, it is expected that 
interim valuations will change more 
quickly for strongly perfo rm ing  
investments than in today’s environ­
ment. On the margin, this should 
not have a significant impact on the 
overall fund valuation unless a man­
ager has previously used the most 
recent round of financing to deter­
mine fair value for a period of time 
that extends beyond the point when 
certain specific factors would indi­
cate the fair value had changed since 
the most recent round.
Some have expressed concern 
that managers will be tem pted to 
raise valuations too quickly. The 
involvement of a valuation policy 
com m ittee will help ensure that 
managers implement the Guidelines 
in a prudent fashion.
VENTURE CAPITAL CONCERNS
A segment of the venture capital 
community is uncomfortable with 
the theoretical ability to write up an 
investm ent w ithout in form ation  
from a subsequent round of financ­
ing. This concern is based partly on 
the belief that the PEIGG Guidelines 
deviate from  past p ractices (for 
example, the de facto NCVA guide­
lines), and partly on concern that 
some managers may arbitrarily write 
up investments, which would put 
pressure on the valuations of other 
managers.
As stated in paragraph 30 of the
3
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G uidelines, “...it is na tu ra l that 
decreases in value may be more eas­
ily iden tified  and ju stified  than
increases in va lue__ However,
increases in investment fair value 
should  be recognized  and war­
ran te d .” PEIGG suggests that an 
increase in value is only warranted 
“...where the manager can clearly 
support the increase....” (see para­
graphs 32-42). In such circum ­
stances, value is determined by evalu­
ating  com parable com pany 
valuations or considering perfor­
mance multiples.
Paragraph  33 states, “These 
Guidelines acknowledge that until 
p roduct or service acceptance is 
achieved, it is unlikely that truly com­
parable  com panies with readily 
determinable fair values will be read­
ily identifiable.”
For early stage venture invest­
ments, it may be unusual that a com­
parable company could be identi­
fied. It may also be rare that an early 
stage venture company has sustain­
able perform ance upon which to 
apply a multiple. Therefore, PEIGG 
suggests tha t it may be only in 
unusual circum stances th a t an 
increase in the value of an early stage 
venture investment be warranted or 
supportable, “in the absence of mar­
ket-based financing events.”
INDUSTRY REACTION
In general, reaction to the Guide­
lines from the private equity industry 
has been  favorable. The NCVA 
Board adopted the following state­
ment:
The NCVA recommends that its 
members create, follow, and communi­
cate clearly the specific procedures and 
methodologies used for valuing their 
portfolios. These methodologies should 
be agreed to by the firm’s investors (LPs) 
and conform when required to Gener­
ally Accepted Accounting Principles, 
recognizing that the ultimate responsi­
bility for valuation remains with the 
general partner. When evaluating cur­
rent valuation procedures or developing
Resources
Investment Companies— AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide 
Paperback: Product no. 01624; members: $55; non-members: $68.75 , Sub­
scription to CD-Rom (Product no. DIN-XX) or online (Product no. WIN-XX); mem­
bers: $61; non-members: $76.25 . Available through 1-888-777-7077 or 
www.cpa2biz.com
Private Equity industry Guidelines Group
www.PEIGG.org. PEIGG Valuation Guidelines and PEIGG Frequently Asked Ques­
tions are available at this site.
Institutional Limited Partners Association
www.ILPA.org
International Private Equity and Venture Capital Valuation Guidelines 
www.privateequityvaluation.com
Financial Accounting Standards Board— Fair Value Measurements 
www.fasb.org/project/fv_measurement.shtml
new approaches, the NVCA suggests its 
members include a review of the Private 
Equity Industry Guidelines Group 
(PEIGG) 12/2003 Private Equity Val­
uations Guidelines’ document (found 
at w w w .pe igg.org) . We commend the fine 
efforts of PEIGG, an independent group 
which sought and reflected input from 
the NVCA and other industry stake­
holders. The NCVA encourages dili­
gence, prudence, and caution when 
implementing the specific elements of 
any guideline, such as valuation write­
ups of early stage companies in the 
absence of market-based financing  
events.
Subsequent to the NCVA state­
ment, the ILPA issued the following 
statement:
...ILPA indicated its satisfaction 
with the National Venture Capital Asso­
ciation’s (NCVA) Board of Directors 
Statement. The Statement, which was 
sent to all its members, suggests that 
members should adopt and document 
valuation methodologies that are agreed 
with their investors and conform to the 
requirement of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles.
Additionally, the ILPA wishes to 
endorse the efforts of the Private Equity 
Industry Guidelines Group (PEIGG) in 
developing Valuation Guidelines and the
NVCA’s recommendation that the PEIGG 
Guidelines be considered the basis for 
their member’s valuation procedures and 
methodology.
The ILPA has been working with the 
PEIGG, the NVCA, AIMR (Association 
for Investment Management and 
Research) and other participants in the 
private equity industry in the United 
States in order to support the various ini­
tiatives directed at the adoption of Valua­
tion Guidelines that conform with the 
requirements of GAAP. The ILPA 
intends to continue to work with the 
PEIGG Valuation Guidelines endorsed or 
adopted.
Over time, with the support of 
ILPA, the NVCA, m anagers and 
investors, the Guidelines will provide 
“managers a framework for valuing 
investments in portfolio companies 
at fair value and to provide greater 
consistency within the private equity 
industry with regard to valuations.”
PEIGG’s work was a major factor 
in encouraging AFIC, NVCA, and 
EVCA to come together and create 
the new In ternational Valuation 
Guidelines.
DEVELOPING BEST ESTIMATES
As the private equity industry has 
matured in the United States, so has
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the need for greater consistency of 
reported results and valuation stan­
dards by managers of, and investors 
in private equity funds. The pro­
posed FASB Fair Value M easure­
ments Standard focuses additional 
attention on PE valuation issues. The 
PEIGG Valuation Guidelines were 
designed to provide a framework 
whereby private equity investments 
could be valued in accordance with 
GAAP, using consistent and trans­
parent methodologies. Judgm ent
In  the KNOW
By Ja m e s  R. H itc h n e r ,  C P A /A B V , ASA, The F in a n c ia l V a lu a t io n  G ro u p , A t la n ta ,  
a m e m b e r o f th e  F in a n c ia l C o n s u lt in g  G roup
Editor’s note: This article is modified 
from “Litigation Services and Fees: 
What Clients Need to Know, ” Finan­
cial V aluation  and L itiga tion  
Expert magazine, June-July, 2006, 
copyright Valuation Products and Ser­
vices, LC, www.valuationproducts.com. 
It is used with permission.
Did you know that financial experts’ 
fees are often higher when they pro­
vide litigation services than when 
they provide o th e r services? O f 
course you did. However, the real 
question  should be, “Do clients 
know?” A lthough many clients 
understand why their attorneys’ fees 
are high, they do not understand 
why the financial experts’ fees may 
be high as well. We’re not talking 
about hourly rates as much as the 
number of hours financial experts 
spend p reparing  and defending  
their work, conclusions, and opin­
ions. So, the next time a client asks 
why your expert fees are so high, 
show them this article.
Fees are high because a good 
financial expert is detail-minded and 
knows that he or she must have good 
command of the facts and proce­
dures in an engagem ent. Why is 
such detailed knowledge needed? 
The answer is that a number of attor­
will always need to be exercised by 
the m anager in determ ining the 
value of an investment in a private 
company. However, application of 
the Guidelines will encourage man­
agers to proactively but prudently 
determine changes in the value of 
their investments. As a result, a sim­
plistic cost bias to the most recent 
round of financing will be elimi­
nated, and managers and investors 
will be able to base decisions and 
record investments using the best
neys will try to make a financial 
expert look biased, unprepared, or 
unqualified, even though he or she 
is not. Experienced experts know 
and anticipate the opposition that 
they will face. They understand that 
attorneys are advocates whose job is 
to convince a trier-of-fact that an 
expert is wrong, even if both the 
expert and, often, the opposing 
counsel know that the expert is 
right. The judicial system for attor­
neys is an advocacy system, a fact that 
is understood  and respected  by 
financial experts who work in litiga­
tion services.
WHAT CLIENTS MUST UNDERSTAND
So what do clients need to know? 
They need to know that it takes time 
and fees to enable experts to with­
stand potentially misdirected cross- 
exam ination. Consequently, the 
number of hours required and the 
related fees are much higher in dis­
pute work than in o ther types of 
work. Experts must always be inde­
pen d en t and objective, but they 
must also defend what they believe 
to be the correct opinion or conclu­
sion, regardless of how much oppos­
ing counsel tries to underm ine  
them. For experts, part of doing a
estimate of fair value resulting from 
utilizing a m ore com prehensive 
group of valuation techniques. X
David L. Larsen, CPA, is a partner in KPMG 
LLP’s Transaction Services Practice, based 
in San Francisco. He leads the Institutional 
Investor segment of KPMG’s Private Equity 
practice. He is a special adviser to the 
Board of Directors of the ILPA and serves 
as technical adviser and project manager 
to PEIGG and PEIGG’s Valuation Subcom­
m ittee. The opinions in this artic le are 
those of Mr. Larsen and not necessarily the 
opinions of KPMG, ILPA, or PEIGG.
good job is to anticipate attacks on 
their work that are not always fair. 
Experts should never be advocates 
for their client’s position, but they 
can and should be advocates of their 
own in d ep en d en t and objective 
opinions and they must take the 
steps necessary to defend their work 
properly.
Furtherm ore, financial experts 
need to keep abreast of the con­
stantly changing developments in 
their industry. Finally, experts must 
expect that anything they have writ­
ten in the past may become part of 
an attorney’s attempt to discredit the 
expert. Coping with these expecta­
tions and issues requires prepara­
tion, which takes time.
So, all your current and potential 
clients must remember that provid­
ing expert testimony includes the 
work of anticipating and preparing 
an appropriate defense of the opin­
ions given, which means that the 
fees for litigation-related work are 
often much higher than for nonliti­
gation work. Computing the value 
or economic damages related to a 
company can be hard; defending 
such work is even harder and is the 
point at which the rubber really hits 
the road. This article is intended to 
help clients understand the envi­
ronment in which financial experts 
work and defend their opinions, 
and again, to explain why litigation 
services can and  o ften  will be 
expensive. Remember: Show this arti­
cle to a client next time they ask 
about your fees. X
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Expert RESPO NSES
REVISITING REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
AND THE MARKET APPROACH
I read with interest the article by 
James A. DiGabriele, CPA, “A Primer 
in Valuing Closely Held Companies 
Using the M arket A pproach and 
Regression Analysis,” in the Spring 
2006 issue of CPA Expert, which sets 
forth what I believe to be the best 
approach to using market transac­
tion databases in the valuation of 
small businesses. However, in his 
enthusiasm for regression analysis, 
the author misinterprets some of the 
regression output metrics and uses, 
for one of his examples, the wrong 
reason for choosing a particular 
model from a selection.
The F ratio
The F ratio is a binary metric; that is, 
either the model as a whole is signifi­
cant, or it is not. There is no sliding 
scale of significance whereby one 
m odel’s higher F ratio indicates a 
be tte r equation than one with a 
lower F ratio. It is better to look at 
their respective standard errors and 
adjusted R2 values to make a choice 
among them.
The Durbin-Watson statistic
The Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistic is 
germane only if one is doing time 
series analysis. Because the market 
transaction databases are cross-sec­
tional in nature, the D-W statistic can 
be ignored. If one obtains a D-W sta­
tistic that indicates autocorrelation 
in a cross-sectional study, then just 
randomly sort the data to solve the 
problem.
R2
Although the R2 value is one of the 
m ost frequen tly  quo ted  values 
derived from a regression analysis, it 
does have one serious drawback: It 
can only increase when extra inde- 
6
pendent variables are added to an 
equation. This can lead to “fishing 
ex p ed itio n s ,” whereby we keep 
adding variables to an equation, 
some of which have no conceptual 
relationship to the dependent vari­
able, just to inflate the R2 value. To 
“penalize” the addition of extra vari­
ables that do not really belong, an 
adjusted R2 value is typically listed in 
regression outputs. If we add vari­
ables and the adjusted R2 decreases, 
then the extra variables are essen­
tially not pulling their weight and 
should probably be omitted. If, on 
the other hand, adjusted R2 increases 
with the addition of other indepen­
d en t variables, then  we have 
increased the explanatory power of 
the model. So the author’s appeal to 
ever-higher R2 values as indicative of 
superior regression models doesn’t 
ring true, because he has created 
those h igher R2 values simply by 
adding more independent variables. 
For multiple regression, adjusted R2 
is the superio r m etric to R2 for 
choosing among models.
Multicollinearity
M ulticollinearity in a prediction 
model, as opposed to a causation 
model, is not necessarily problematic 
in accurate forecasts of value. It can 
cause trouble, however, when con­
founding variables produce coeffi­
cient signs that are reversed from 
their norm al and intuitive value, 
because this is difficult to explain to 
a trier-of-fact.
Model metrics
The author suggests that R2 and F 
ratios are the metrics of choice when 
choosing the best model for valua­
tion purposes. However, he ignores 
the very first metric one should turn
to in a multiple regression environ­
ment, namely, the individual t-statis­
tic for each independent variable. 
The rule of thumb is that any inde­
pendent variable with a t-statistic of 
less than 2 should be considered for 
removal from the model, and that 
absolutely any t-statistic of less than 1 
ought to be removed. Once you have 
a model that consists only of signifi­
cant in d ep en d en t variables, you 
should then choose the model that 
has the lowest standard error and 
the highest adjusted R2 value.
Market transaction databases
The market transaction databases we 
have to work with (Pratt’s Stats, Biz- 
comps, etc.) supply a limited number 
of independent variables with which 
to run a regression analysis. As such, 
the author has used sales, total assets, 
and some form of net income as his 
independent variables in both indus­
tries. The problem is that all three of 
these variables are size-oriented; that 
is, companies with large revenue 
amounts tend to have large amounts 
of assets and net incomes. This rela­
tionship creates the multicollinearity 
problem mentioned above, because 
each additional variable doesn ’t 
explain anything new. The use of 
adjusted R2 would, of course, have 
made this evident. Perhaps the use of 
ratios, such as total assets/sales or net 
income/sales, as independent vari­
ables would produce more powerful 
models. However, the principle of 
Occam’s Razor (which tells us that 
entities should not be m ultiplied 
needlessly, and that the simplest of 
two competing theories is to be pre­
ferred) requires us to use the sim­
plest explanation available, and that 
is why regressing price against rev­
enue or some form of net income 
will usually produce the best answer 
with a model that gives us the best fit 
as measured by the proper metrics.
Respectfully,
Mark G. Filler, CPA/ABV, CBA, AM, CVA 
Filler &  Associates, P.A.
Portland, Maine 
www.filler.com
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AUTHOR'S RESPONSE
Mr. Filler obviously shares my enthu­
siasm for using regression analysis in 
valuation. Here are my responses to 
his criticisms:
The F ratio
The F test compares the fit of two 
equations, in which the more com­
plicated  equation  (the one with 
more variables) fits better (has a 
smaller sum-of-squares) than the 
simple equation with fewer vari­
ables. The question is whether this 
decrease in sum-of-squares is worth 
the cost of the additional variables 
(degrees of freedom ). The F test 
answers this question. The refer­
ence to the standard  erro r, also 
called the root mean square error, 
refers to the standard deviation of 
the data about the regression line, 
rather than about the sample mean. 
The objective of my article is to pro­
vide a primer. The topic of standard 
errors appears to be outside the 
scope of a primer article however, 
but is relevant to an extension of 
this article.
EQUITY RISK PREMIUM: 2006 UPDATE
By R oger J. G ra b o w s k i,  ASA
Are you aware of recent research 
questioning the use of those realized 
equity premiums as an estimate of 
the equity risk premium (ERP)?1, 2 3
Or, do you simply choose to ignore 
the research?
ERP is a forward-looking concept. 
ERP is an expectation as of the valua­
tion date for which no “m arket 
quotes” are observable. Although 
you can observe premiums realized 
over time by referring to historical 
data, such calculated  prem ium s
The Durbin-Watson statistic
The purpose of the article was to cre­
ate awareness. Every basic economet­
rics course introduces this statistic as 
part of regression diagnostics. Yes, it 
is true that the Durbin-Watson statis­
tic is prevalent in time-series analysis. 
Mr. Filler admitted that autocorrela­
tion may also occur in cross-section 
data. In the end, it adds value to 
introduce this statistic.
R2
Again, the article was clearly entitled 
“A Primer. “ The reader interested in 
applying these concepts in practice 
needs to first understand R2 before 
adjusted R2. This explanation clearly 
does just that.
Multicollinearity
The topic of multicollinearity is nec­
essary for the reader to understand 
from inception that correlation of 
variables may not be good in all cases.
Model metrics
The article attempted to introduce 
topics as they would be introduced in
serve only as estim ates for the 
expected ERP. If we truly want to 
mimic the market, our goal must be 
to estimate the true expected ERP as 
of the valuation date. To do that, you 
need to look beyond the realized 
premiums.
Although there is no single, uni­
versally accepted standard for esti­
mating ERP, you must be aware of 
recent research and not blindly use 
the historical realized equity premi­
ums reported in the SBBI Yearbook.3
an introductory regression/econo- 
metrics course. Most follow this intro­
duction of these topics. The point 
made here is for another day. The 
foundation must come first, and then 
these concepts may be introduced.
Market Transaction Databases
Many published articles have used 
the same type of independent vari­
ables. I am not sure why ratios of the 
same variables would not be referred 
to as size bias, since the numbers are. 
The author of the critique refers to 
regressing price against revenue or 
net income. Model 2 does that.
There is a dearth of continuing 
professional education courses on this 
topic for valuation professionals. 
Therefore, I think it would be produc­
tive for our peers if the author and I 
were to collaborate on a part II of the 
article discussed here for future publi­
cation in CPA Expert. I will go further 
and extend an invitation to the author 
of this critique to collaborate on the 
development of a course on this topic.
Thank you,
James A. DiGabriele, D.P.S., CPA/ABV
The methods used can be broadly 
categorized in to  one of two 
approaches: the realized return or ex 
post approach, and the forward-look­
ing or ex ante approach.
EX POST APPROACH
The realized re tu rn  approach  
employs the premium that investors 
have, on the average, realized over 
some historical holding period (his­
torical realized p rem ium ). The 
underlying theory is that the past 
provides an indicator of how the 
market will behave in the future, and 
investors’ expectations are influ­
enced by the historical performance 
of the m arket. If periodic  (say,
1 Readers interested in more detailed information on the ERP issue are invited to attend the American Society of Appraisers’ Center for Advanced Business Valuation 
Studies Cost of Capital course and to read Grabowski and King, Chapter 1, “Equity Risk Premium,” in The Handbook of Business Valuation and Intellectual Property Analysis, 
(McGraw-Hill, 2004); “Equity Risk Premium: What Valuation Consultants Need to Know About Current Research” Valuation Strategies (Sept/Oct 2003); “Equity Risk Pre­
mium: What Valuation Consultants Need to Know About Current Research—2005 Update,” Valuation Strategies (Sept/Oct 2005); “Equity Risk Premium—What is the 
Current Evidence,” Business Valuation Review (Fall 2005).
2 The equity risk premium (ERP) (sometimes referred to as the market risk premium) is defined as the extra return (over the expected yield on government securities) 
that investors expect to receive from an investment in a diversified portfolio of common stocks. ERP = Rm -  Rf  where Rm is the expected return on a fully diversified 
portfolio of equity securities and Rf is the rate of return expected on an investment free of default risk.
3 Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation Valuation Edition 2006 Yearbook (Ibbotson Associates, 2006).
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monthly) returns are serially inde­
pendent (i.e., not correlated) and if 
expected returns are stable through 
time, the arithmetic average of his­
torical returns provides an unbiased 
estimate of expected future returns. 
A more indirect justification for use 
of the historical approach is the con­
tention that, for whatever reason, 
securities in the past have been 
priced so as to earn  the retu rns 
observed. By using the historical real­
ized prem ium  in applying the 
income approach to valuation (i.e., 
in the discounted cash-flow valuation 
method), one may, to some extent, 
replicate this level of pricing.
Academics often formulate their 
research in terms of the equity risk 
premium relative to Treasury bills. 
But the variability of Treasury bill 
returns is such that one can hardly 
consider them riskless. Further, we 
are generally valuing closely held 
businesses. Those investments are 
generally considered long term, and 
long-term government bonds are the 
benchmark security we use in devel­
oping discount rates. Therefore, in 
this article, we have reported the 
research results in terms of the pre­
mium over long-term government 
bonds in calculating the historical 
realized premium.4 In applying the 
realized return method, the analyst 
selects the number of years of histori­
cal return data to include in the aver­
age. One school of thought holds 
that the future is best estimated using 
a very long horizon of past returns. 
Another school of thought holds that 
the future is best measured by the 
(relatively) recent past. These differ­
ences in opinion produce disagree­
ment as to the number of years to 
include in the average.
Although the SBBI Yearbook con­
tains sum m aries of 
returns on U.S. stocks 
and bonds derived from 
the data that have been 
accum ulated  by the 
Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) 
at the University of 
Chicago since 1926, 
good stock market data 
are available back to 
1871, and less reliable 
data are available from 
various sources back to 
the end of the e igh­
teenth century. Data for 
yields on governm ent 
bonds are also available 
for these p e rio d s .5 
Exhibit 1 above displays realized 
average annual premiums of stock 
m arket re tu rn s  (relative to the 
income return on long-term govern­
ment bonds) for alternative periods 
through 2005.
The historical realized premium 
is measured by comparing the stock 
market returns realized during the 
period  to the incom e re tu rn  on 
bonds. Although the stock market 
return cannot be ascertained at the 
beginning of the investment period, 
the rate of interest promised on a 
long-term  governm ent bond  is 
known in terms of the yield to matu­
rity. Therefore, analysts measure the 
stock market returns realized over 
the expected returns on bonds. An 
investor makes a decision to invest in 
the stock market today by comparing 
the expected return from that invest­
ment to the return on a benchmark 
security (in this case, the long-term 
government bond), given the rate of 
re tu rn  today on that benchm ark 
security. The realized re tu rn  
approach is based on the expecta­
Exhibit 1. Historical Realized Equity Risk 
Premiums: Stock Market Returns Versus 
Treasury Bonds (Income Returns)
Period Arithmetic Geometric
20  years (since 1986) 6.4% 5.1%
30  years (since 1976) 6.0% 4.9%
40  years (since 1966) 4.2% 2.9%
50 years (since 1956) 5.0% 3.8%
80  years (since 1926) 7.1% 5.2%
106 years (since 1900) 6.7% 4.9%
134 years (since 1872) 5.9% 4.3%
208 years (since 1798) 5.1% 3.6%
tion that history will repeat itself and 
such a premium return will again be 
realized (on the average) in the 
future.
SELECTION OF THE OBSERVATION PERIOD
The historical realized prem ium  
derived from realized returns is sen­
sitive to the period chosen for the 
average. For exam ple, if one 
includes in the average only 
observed premiums in the immedi­
ate past period, that ex post premium 
may be the inverse of the ex ante esti­
m ate tha t analysts are seeking. 
Almost all practitioners who use his­
torical data focus on a longer run 
view of historical returns. But the 
selection of the period over which to 
measure those returns is key.
The selection of 1926 as a starting 
point is a happenstance of the arbi­
trary selection of that date by the 
founders of the CRSP database. The 
average calculated using 1926 return 
data as a beginning point may be too 
heavily influenced by the unusually 
low interest rates during the 1930s to 
mid 1950s. Some observers have sug­
4 In applying the ERP in, say, the CAPM, one must use the return on a risk-free security with a term (maturity) consistent with the benchmark security used in developing 
the ERP. For example, this article measures ERP in terms of the premium over that of long-term government bonds. In CAPM, ke = Rf  + (Beta _ ERP). The Rf  used as of 
the valuation date should be the yield on a long-term government bond because the data cited herein have been developed comparing equity returns to the income 
return (i.e., the yield promised at issue date) of long-term government bonds.
5 See Fisher and Lorie, “Rates of Return on Investments in Common Stocks,” 37-1 Journal of Business (1964); Wilson and Jones, “A Comparison of Annual Stock Market 
Returns: 1871-1925 with 1926-1985,” 60-2 Journal of Business 1 (1987); Schwert, “Indexes of Common Stock Returns from 1802 to 1987,” 60-3 Journal of Business 239 
(1990); Ibbotson and Brinson, Global Investing (McGraw-Hill, 1993); Wilson and Jones, “An Analysis of the S&P 500 Index and Cowles’s Extensions: Price Indexes and 
Stock Returns, 1870-1999,” 75-3 Journal of Business 505 (2002); Wright, “Measures of Stock Market Value and Returns for the US Nonfinancial Corporate Sector, 1900- 
2000,” Working paper, 2/1/02.; Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Peng, “A New Historical Database for the NYSE 1815 to 1925: Performance and Predictability,” Journal of 
Financial Markets 4 (2001) 1-32; Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton, Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years of Global Investment Returns (Princeton University Press, 2002) with 
annual updates of their Global Returns database for 17 countries, including the United States, available at www.ibbotson.com.
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gested tha t the period , which 
includes the 1930s, 1940s, and the 
immediate post-World War II boom 
period , may have exh ib ited  an 
unusually high average realized 
return premium. If we disaggregate 
the 80 years reported in the SBBI 
Yearbook into two sub-periods, the 
first covering the periods before and 
after the mid 1950s, we get the fol­
lowing comparative figures for stock 
and bond re tu rn s  as shown in 
Exhibit 2 on page 10.
The period since the mid 1950s 
has been characterized by a more 
stable stock m arket and a m ore 
volatile bond market compared to 
the earlier period. Interest rates have 
become more volatile in the later 
period.6 The effect is amplified in 
the volatility of bond total returns.7 
These data indicate that the relative 
risk of stocks versus bonds is lower 
today, which indicates that the equity 
risk premium is likely lower today. 
Thus, the historical arithmetic aver­
age realized premium reported in 
the SBBI Yearbook, as measured from 
1926, likely overstates the expected 
returns as of 2006.
If the average expected return on 
stocks has changed through time, 
the averages of realized re tu rns 
using the longest available data 
become questionable. A short-run 
horizon may give a better estimate if 
changes in econom ic conditions 
have created a different expected 
return  environm ent than that of 
more remote past periods. For exam­
ple, why not use the average realized 
return over the past 20-year period? 
A drawback of using averages over 
shorter periods is that they are sus­
ceptible to the high volatility of 
annual stock returns that gives rise to
large errors in measuring the true 
ERP. Also, the average of the real­
ized premiums over the past 20 years 
may overstate today’s expected  
returns as a result of the general 
downward m ovem ent of in terest 
rates since 1981.
Even using long-term observa­
tions, the volatility of annual stock 
returns is high. For example, the 
standard deviation of the realized 
average return for the entire 80-year 
period from 1926 to 2005 is approxi­
mately 20%. Even assuming that the 
80-year average gives an unbiased 
estimate, a 95% confidence interval 
for the unobserved true ERP still 
spans a range of approximately 2.7% 
to 11.5%.
WHICH AVERAGE— ARITHMETIC OR 
GEOMETRIC?
Realized return premiums measured 
using geometric (compound) aver­
ages are always less than those using 
the arithmetic average. The choice 
of which average to use remains a 
matter of disagreement among prac­
titioners. The arithm etic average 
receives the most support in the lit­
erature,8 910other authors recommend 
a geometric average,9 and still others 
support something in between.10 The 
use of the arithmetic average relies 
on the assumption that (1) market 
returns are serially independent (not 
correlated) and (2) the distribution 
of market returns is stable (not time- 
varying). Under these assumptions, 
an arithmetic average gives an unbi­
ased estimate of expected future 
returns. Empirical studies generally 
indicate a fairly low degree of serial 
correlation, supporting use of the 
arithmetic average. Moreover, the 
more observations, the more accu­
rate the estimate will be.
But even if one agrees that stock 
returns are serially independent, the 
arithmetic average of one-year real­
ized premiums may not be the best 
estimate of future premiums. Text­
book models of stock returns (e.g., 
CAPM) are generally single-period 
models that estimate returns over 
unspecified investment horizons. As 
the investment horizon increases, 
the arithmetic average of realized 
premiums decreases asymptotically 
to the geom etric average of the 
entire realized premium series. As a 
result, some recommend using the 
midpoint of the arithmetic average 
of one-year realized premiums and 
the geometric average of the entire 
realized premium series as the best 
estimate of the future premiums if 
one is using historical realized pre­
miums as the basis for the future 
ERP estimate.1
EXPECTED ERP VERSUS REALIZED EQUITY 
PREMIUMS
Recently, much has been written 
comparing the realized returns as 
reported in sources such as the SBBI 
Yearbook, with the ERP that must have 
been expected by investors given the 
underlying economics of publicly 
traded companies (i.e., expected 
growth in earnings or expected 
growth in dividends) and the underly­
ing economics of the economy (i.e., 
expected growth in gross domestic 
product [GDP]). Such studies con­
clude that investors could not have 
expected as large an ERP as the 
equity premiums actually realized.
Roger Ibbotson and Peng Chen 
have reported on their study of esti­
mated forward-looking long-term 
sustainable equity re tu rn s  and
6 As reflected in Ibbotson Associates’ Long-term Treasury Bond Income Return statistics.
7 As reflected in Ibbotson Associates’ Long-term Treasury Bond Total Returns, which include the capital gains and losses associated with interest rate fluctuations.
8 E.g., Kaplan, “Why the Expected Rate of Return Is an Arithmetic Average,” 14-3 Business Valuation Review 126 (September 1995); Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation Valuation 
Edition 2005 Yearbook, (Ibbotson Associates, 2005) pp. 75-77; Kritzman, “What Practitioners Need to Know About Future Value,” 50-3 Financial Analysts Journal 12 
(May/June 1994); Bodie, Kane, and Marcus, Investments (Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,1989) p. 720.
9 E.g., Damodaran, Investment Valuation, 2nd ed. (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2002) p. 161.
10 Copeland, Koller and Murrin, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies, 3rd ed. (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000) p. 218; Koller, Goedhart, and Wessels, Valu­
ation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies, 4th ed. (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005), p. 299-302; Cornell, The Equity Risk Premium (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,1999) p. 
36; Julius, “Market Returns in Rolling Multi-Year Holding Periods: An Alternative Interpretation to Ibbotson Data,” 15-2 Business Valuation Review 57 (June 1996).
11 Note 10, supra.
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Exhibit 2. Historical Realized Returns: Relative Volatility of 
Stock Returns to Bond Returns
1 9 2 6 -1 9 5 7 1 9 5 8 -2 0 0 5
Arithmetic Averages
Realized Equity Risk Premiums Over Treasury Bond Income 
Returns Nominal (i.e., Without Inflation Removed)
9.5% 5.4%
Geometric Average 6.6% 4.2%
STANDARD DEVIATIONS
Stock Market Annual Returns 24.8% 16.7%
Long-term Treasury Bond
Income Returns 0.5% 2.4%
Total Returns 4.9% 11.0%
Ratio of Equity to Bond 
Total Return Volatility 5.1 1.5
Source: Ibbotson Associates’ data; calculations by author.
expected ERPs.12 They first analyzed 
historical equity returns by decom­
posing returns into factors including 
inflation, earnings, dividends, price- 
to-earnings ratios, dividend-payout 
ratios, book values, re tu rn s  on 
equity, and GDP per capita. They 
forecast what could have been 
expected as an ERP through “supply- 
side” models built from historical 
data. In the most recent update to 
this study, reported in the SBBI Year­
book, Ibbotson Associates determined 
that the long-term ERP that could 
have been expected , given the 
underlying economics, was approxi­
mately 6.3% on an arithmetic basis 
(4.2% on a geometric basis) com­
pared to the historical realized risk 
premium of 7.1% on an arithmetic 
basis (5.2% on a geometric basis). 
The greater-than-expected historical 
realized equity returns were caused 
by an unexpected increase in market 
multiples relative to economic fun­
damentals (i.e., a decline in the dis­
count rates).
What caused the decline in dis­
count rates that led to the unex­
pected capital gain? The marginal 
income tax rate declined (the mar­
ginal tax rate on corporate distribu­
tions averaged 43% in the 1955-1962 
period and averaged only 17% in the 
1987-2000 period), and equity invest­
ments could not be held “tax free” in 
1962. By 2000, however, equity invest­
ment could be held “tax deferred” in 
defined benefit and contribution 
pension plans and in individual 
retirement accounts. The decrease in 
income tax rates on corporate distri­
butions and the inflow of retirement 
plan investment capital into equity 
investments combined to lower dis­
count rates and increase market mul­
tiples relative to economic funda­
mentals.13
If it is assumed that investors did 
not anticipate the changes in factors 
that caused declining discount rates, 
it becomes clear that the true ERP 
during this period has been less than 
the historical realized premium cal­
culated as the arithmetic average of 
excess returns realized since 1926. If 
it is further assumed that a repetition 
of such changes is neither likely nor 
anticipated by investors, then the 
true ERP as of today can also be 
expected to be less than the histori­
cal realized premium.
EX ANTE APPROACHES
Merrill Lynch publishes “bottom-up” 
expected return estimates for the 
S&P 500 stock index derived from 
averaging return estimates for stocks 
in the Standard & Poors (S&P) 500 
Index. Although Merrill Lynch does 
not cover every company in the S&P 
500 Index, it does cover a high per­
centage of the companies measured 
in market value terms. Merrill Lynch 
uses a multistage dividend discount 
model (DDM) to calculate expected 
returns for several hundred compa­
nies using projections from its own 
securities analysts. The resulting data 
are published monthly in the Merrill 
Lynch publication Quantitative Pro­
files. The Merrill Lynch expected 
return estimates have indicated an 
implied ERP ranging from 3% to 7% 
in recent years (approximately 6.6% 
at the end of 2005), with an average 
over the last 15 years of approxi­
mately 4.6%.14
One study reports  the results 
from a series of surveys of ch ief 
financial officers (CFOs) of U.S. cor­
porations conducted from mid 2000 
to the end  of 2005. T hat study 
reports that the range of ERP given a 
10-year investment horizon was 3.6% 
to 4.7% (premium over 10-year Trea­
sury bonds). The most recent survey 
reports  an ERP given a 10-year 
investment horizon was 4.7% on an 
arithmetic average basis (2.4% on a 
geometric average basis).15
12 Ibbotson and Chen, “Long-Run Stock Returns, Participating in the Real Economy,” 59-1 Financial Analysts Journal 88 (January/February 2003) updated in Stocks, Bonds, 
Bills and Inflation, Valuation Edition 2006 Yearbook (Ibbotson Associates, 2006) p. 98.
13 McGrattan and Prescott, “Is the Market Overvalued?” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (24, 2000) and “Taxes, Regulations and Asset Prices,” Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Working Paper 610 (July 2001).
14 Use of analyst projections leads one to the literature on analyst projection bias (i.e., are analyst forecasts overly optimistic?). For example, see Ramnath, Rock, and Stone, 
“Value Line and I/B/E/S earnings forecasts,” Working Paper (Nov 2001). The authors report the results of projected earnings amounts, rather than growth rates. (They
use the I/B/E/S long-term growth rate to project the EPS four years into the future, and compares this with the actual EPS four years in the future. The results indicate 
that I/B/E/S mean forecast error in year 4 EPS is negative. This can be tr anslated into a preliminary typical growth rate adjustment for, say, a projected 15% growth rate 
as follows: ((1,15^4) (1-.0545))^ .25 -1 = 13.4%, implying a ratio of actual to forecast of .134/.15 = .89. This would imply that equity risk premium forecasts using analyst 
forecasts are biased high. See also, Bonini, Zanetti and Bianchini, ‘Target Price Accuracy in Equity Research,” Working Paper (Jan 2006).
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Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and 
Mike Staunton studied the realized 
equity returns and historical equity 
premiums for 17 countries (includ­
ing the U.S.) from 1900 to the end 
of2005.16
These authors report that the his­
torical equity premiums have been 
6.5% on an arithmetic basis (4.6% on 
a geometric basis) for the United 
States (in excess of the total return on 
bonds) and 5.2% on an arithmetic 
basis (4.0% on a geometric basis) for 
the total of the 17 countries.
They observe larger equity 
returns earned in the second half of 
the twentieth century compared to 
the first half resulting from (1) cor­
porate cash flows growing faster than 
investors anticipated, fueled by rapid 
technological change and unprece­
dented growth in productivity and 
efficiency; (2) transaction and moni­
toring costs falling over the course of 
the century; (3) inflation rates gen­
erally declining over the final two 
decades of the century and resulting 
in an increase in real interest rates; 
and (4) required rates of return on 
equity declining as a result of dimin­
ished business and investment risks. 
They conclude that the observed 
increase in the overall price-to-divi­
dend ratio over the century is attrib­
utable to a long-term decrease in the 
required risk premium, a decrease 
tha t will no t con tinue  in to  the 
future. The authors note that:
Further adjustments should almost 
certainly be made to historical risk premi­
ums to reflect long-term changes in capi­
tal market conditions. Since, in most 
countries corporate cash flows historically 
exceeded investors’ expectations, a further
downward adjustment is in order.
They conclude that a downward 
adjustment in the expected ERP com­
pared to the historical equity premi­
ums resulting from the increase in 
the price dividend ratio is reasonable. 
Further, they conclude that a further 
downward adjustm ent in the 
expected ERP of approximately 50 to 
100 basis points is plausible if one 
assumes that the current level of divi­
dend yield will continue (versus the 
greater historical average yield).
Removing the historical increase 
in the price dividend ratio and adjust­
ing the historical average dividend 
yield to today’s dividend yield results 
in an expected equity premium (rela­
tive to bonds) of approximately 4.8% 
to 5.3% on an arithmetic basis (2.8% 
to 3.3% on a geometric basis) for the 
United States and 3.5% to 4.0% on 
an arithmetic basis (2.4% to 2.9% on 
a geometric basis) for a world index 
(denominated in U.S. dollars for 17 
countries).17
The SBBI Yearbook reports on an 
update to the work au tho red  by 
Ibbotson and Chen, forecasting an 
ERP based on the contribution of 
earnings growth to price to earn­
ings ratio growth and on growth in 
pe r cap ita  GDP (a supply-side 
a p p ro a c h ) .18 They rem ove the 
increase in historical returns attrib­
utable to the overall increase in 
price-to-earnings ratio from 1926 to 
2005 resulting in an estim ate of 
ERP at the end of 2005 of approxi­
mately 6.3% on an arithmetic basis 
(4.2% on a geometric basis).
William Goetzmann and Ibbot­
son, commenting on the supply-side 
approach of estimating expected risk
premiums, note:
These forecasts tend to give somewhat 
lower forecasts than historical risk premi­
ums, primarily because part of the total 
returns of the stock market have come 
from price-earnings ratio expansion. This 
expansion is not predicted to continue 
indefinitely, and should logically be 
removed from the expected risk premium.19
Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart, and 
David Wessels conclude on their 
assessment of the research and evi­
dence:
Although many in the finance profes­
sion disagree about how to measure the 
ERP, we believe 4.5 to 5.5 percent is the 
appropriate ranged.20
CONCLUSION
Estimating the ERP is one of the 
most im portant issues involved in 
estimating the cost of capital of the 
subject business. One needs to con­
sider a variety of alternative sources, 
including realized returns over vari­
ous periods and forward-looking esti­
mates such as those implied from 
projections of future prices, divi­
dends, and earnings.
What is a reasonable estimate of 
ERP in 2006? Considering long-run 
historical arithmetic averages of real­
ized returns, this author concludes 
that the post-1925 historical arith­
metic average of one-year realized 
premiums as reported in the SBBI 
Yearbook results in an expected ERP 
estimate that is too high. My conclu­
sion is based on the works of various 
researchers (e.g., Dimson, Marsh and 
Staunton, Goetzmann and Ibbotson) 
and curren t m arket expectations 
(e.g., the survey of CFOs).
A number of appraisers express
15 Graham and Harvey, “Expectations of Equity Risk Premia, Volatility and Asymmetry from a Corporate Finance Perspective,” National Bureau of Economic Research 
working paper, December 2001, updated quarterly by Duke CFO Outlook Survey (www.cfosurvey.org); “The Equity Risk Premium in January 2006: Evidence from the 
Global CFO Outlook Survey,” Dec 19, 2005.
16 Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton, “Global Evidence on the Equity Premium,” 15-4 The Journal of Applied Corporate Finance (Summer 2003); T h e  Worldwide Equity Pre­
mium: A Smaller Puzzle,” April 7, 2006; The Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2006 (ABN-AMRO/London Business School, 2006).
17 Based on this author’s converting premium over total returns on bonds as reported by Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton, removing the impact of the growth in price-divi­
dend ratios from the geometric average historical premium, reducing the historical average dividend yield to a current dividend yield, and converting to an approxi­
mate arithmetic average.
One method of converting the geometric average into an arithmetic average is to assume the returns are independently log-normally distributed over time. Then the 
arithmetic and geometric averages approximately follow the relationship: The arithmetic average of returns for the period = Geometric average of returns for the period 
+ (variance of returns for the period/2).
18 Note 12, supra; Ibbotson, “Equity Risk Premium Forum,” AIMR, 11/8/01, pp. 100-104, 108.
19 Goetzmann and Ibbotson, “History and the Equity Risk Premium,” Yale ICF Working Paper No. 05-04 (April 2005), p. 8.
20 Note 10, supra: Koller et al., p. 306.
11
CPA Expert Summer 2006
dismay over the necessity of consid­
ering a forward ERP since that would 
requ ire  changing  the ir cu rren t 
“cookbook” practice of relying exclu­
sively on the post-1925 historical 
arithmetic average of one-year real­
ized premiums reported in the SBBI 
Yearbook as their estimate of the ERP. 
My reply is that valuation is a for­
ward-looking concept, not an exer­
cise in mechanical application of for­
mulas. Correct valuation requires 
applying value drivers reflected in 
today’s market pricing. Our role is to 
mimic the market. In the experience 
of this author, one often cannot 
match current market pricing for 
equities using the post-1925 histori­
cal arithmetic average of one-year 
realized premiums as the basis for 
developing d iscoun t rates. The
21 Where in this range is the current ERP? Research has shown that ERP is cyclical during the business cycle. If the 
economy is near or in recession (as reflected in relatively recent low returns on stocks), the conditional ERP is 
more likely at the higher end of the range. If the economy improves (with expectations of improvements 
reflected in higher stock returns), the conditional ERP moves toward the midpoint of the range. If the economy 
is near its peak (as reflected in relatively recent high stock returns), the conditional ERP is more likely at the 
lower end of the range. This author will let the reader decide where his valuation date lies in the business cycle.
entire appraisal process is based on 
applying reasoned judgment to the 
evidence derived from economic, 
financial, and other information and 
arriving at a well reasoned opinion 
of value. Estimating the ERP is no 
different. I challenge all appraisers 
to look at the evidence.
After considering the evidence, 
any reasonable long-term estimate of 
the normal ERP as of 2006 should be 
in the range of 3.5% to 6%.21
Roger Grabowski is a Managing Director of 
Duff & Phelps LLC in Chicago, IL. The 
author thanks Ryan Brown and David Tur­
ney of Duff and Phelps and former col­
league, David King, for their assistance. 
N evertheless, the author accepts  full 
responsibility for the final form of the  
paper. Moreover, this work should not be 
construed as representing the official posi­
tion of any organization.
Win and Win Again
You all know that if you go to the gam­
ing tables in a Las Vegas casino, the 
odds are against your winning big. The 
odds in your favor will increase, how­
ever, if you go to Las Vegas September 
2 8 -2 9 , 2 0 0 6  to attend the AICPA  
National Conference on Fraud and Liti­
gation Services. The odds are very good 
that you’ll find something of value 
throughout the conference. During each 
concurrent session period, two sessions 
will be in the fraud track, two in the liti­
gation services track, and one in the 
fraud and litigation services track. So 
you can’t  lose, whatever your niche is.
Another Sure Win
Win again in Austin, TX. No gaming 
tables, but a sure payoff if you attend the 
AICPA National Business Valuation Con­
ference, December 3 -8 , 2006. Always 
drawing a big crowd, the BV Conference 
offers opportunities to explore the latest 
ideas, tools, and solutions for continued 
success as a valuation analyst.
For more information about each con­
ference, visit www.CPA2Biz.com or call 
1-888-777-7077.
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